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Diamond: The Sixth Amendment: Narrowing the Scope of the Right to Counsel

THE SIXTH AMENDMENT: NARROWING THE SCOPE
OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001)
Benjamin F. Diamond
Respondent confessed to burglarizing a home but denied any
involvement in the disappearance of the home's residents, who were
reported missing shortly after the burglary.' Respondent was appointed a
lawyer and was released on bond.2 Several months later, police officers
took Respondent into custody without contacting his lawyer, read him his
rights pursuant to Mirandav. Arizona,3 and questioned him further about
the disappearances; Respondent waived his rights and confessed to the
killings.4 A jury convicted Respondent of capital murder and sentenced
him to death.' The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and
remanded for a new trial,6 reasoning that Respondent's Sixth Amendment
right to counsel attached to the capital murder offense, which was
"factually interwoven with the burglary," and that therefore the police
were obligated to contact the lawyer and obtain his permission prior to
* My thanks to Professor Christopher Slobogin. For my parents, Dr. Frank and Sandra
Diamond.
1. Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 165 (2001).
2. Id
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Pursuant to this decision, a defendant must be informed that he has
the right to remain silent, that anything he says can and will be used against him in court, that he
has the right to consult with a lawyer and have the lawyer present with him during interrogation,
and that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him without costs. See id. at 47173.
4. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 165. Respondent said that he was trying to remove the stereo when he
stabbed Margaret Owings. Id He then stated:
I went back to her house and I saw the baby laying on its bed. I took the baby out
there and it was sleeping the whole time. I laid the baby down on the ground four
or five feet away from its mother. I went back to my house and got a flat edge
shovel. That's all I could find. Then I went back over to where they were and I
started digging a hole between them. After I got the hole dug, the baby was
awake. It started going toward its mom and it fell in the hole. I put the lady in the
hole and I covered them up. I remember stabbing a different knife I had in the
ground where they were. I was crying right then.
Id at 166.
5. Id.In Texas, a person commits the offense of capital murder if he murders more than one
person during the same criminal transaction. TEx. PENAL CODE § 19.03(a)(7)(A) (1994).
6. Cobb v. Texas, No. 72,807, 2000 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 32, at *13 (Tex. Crim. App.
Mar. 15, 2000).
1001
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questioning Respondent.7 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari,' reversed the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decision, and
HELD, that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense-specific and
does not extend to other crimes that are "factually related" to those that
have been charged.9
The Court has long recognized that a defendant's Sixth Amendment"0
right to counsel is fundamental." The purpose of this right is to protect
"the unaided laymen at critical confrontations" with the government.' 2 In
defining the scope of this right, the Supreme Court has struggled to
balance the social interest of controlling crime with the need to protect the
due process rights of the accused and the fairness of the adversarial system
ofjustice.'3
In McNeil v. Wisconsin,14 the Supreme Court held that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is offense-specific. 5 The Court cautioned that
a defendant could not invoke his right to counsel once for all future
prosecutions, because the right does not attach until the prosecution
commences. 6 In McNeil, Petitioner was arrested for armed robbery and
was represented by counsel at a preliminary court appearance. 7 Police
then questioned Petitioner in a murder investigation without his lawyer
present."8 Petitioner eventually waived his Miranda rights, provided the
police with detailed statements, and was convicted of second degree
murder and attempted first degree murder.' 9 Affirming the conviction, the
Supreme Court held that while Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to
7. Id. at * 11. The court recognized that the admission of Respondent's confession into
evidence was not harmless error, but was "central to the prosecution's case," and that "a reasonable
likelihood exists that the admission of the statement in evidence materially affected the jury's
deliberations." Id. at * 12.
8. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 167.
9. Id.
10. The Sixth Amendment states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to ... be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
11. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335,344 (1963) (proclaiming that"lawyers [for defendants] in criminal courts are necessities,
not luxuries. The right of one charged with a crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and
essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours.").
12. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984).
13. See ALFREDO GARCIA, THE SixTH AMENDMENT IN MODERN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE:
A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE 15-17 (1992).

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

501 U.S. 171 (1991).
Id. at 175.
Id.
Id. at 173.
Id. at 173-74.
Id.
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counsel had attached with respect to the armed robbery, it had not attached
to the murder charge.2" That, the Court reasoned, was a different offense.2
This holding stands in stark contrast to the operation of a defendant's
right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment.22 While the Court in McNeil
held that the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment is offensespecific, the Court simultaneously noted that the right to counsel under the
Fifth Amendment is not offense-specific?' Petitioner urged the Court in
McNeil to clarify this discrepancy and provide the police with a clear
guideline-no police initiated interrogations regarding any offense if the
defendant has requested a lawyer.24 The Court, however, declined to adopt
this bright-line rule.' As a result, a significant disparity exists between the
right to counsel found in the Fifth Amendment and the right found in the
Sixth Amendment.26

20. Id. at 175-76.
21. Id.
22. The Fifth Amendment right to counsel protects the defendant during custodial
interrogations, whereas the Sixth Amendment protection attaches only when the defendant has been
formally charged with a crime. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: REGULATION
OF POLICE INVESTIGATION: LEGAL, HISTORICAL, EMPIRICAL AND COMPARATIVE MATERiALS 437-39

(1998). The Sixth Amendment is implicated when "the adverse positions of government and
defendant have solidified" so that "a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces
of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law."
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972).
23. McNeil, 501 U.S. at 177. Once a defendant asserts his Fifth Amendment right to counsel,
police may not approach him for further interrogation regarding any offense "until counsel has been
made available to him." Id. (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981)). Once a
defendant asserts his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, however, the police may still question him
regarding other unrelated offenses without his lawyer present. See id. at 177-78.
24. See id at l8l.
25. See id. at 181-82 ("[T]he police do not need our assistance to establish such a guideline;
they are free, if they wish, to adopt it on their own.").
26. This disparity has been criticized as unpractical by both members of the Court and
academics. For instance,
Although judges and lawyers may understand and appreciate the subtle
distinctions between the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, the average
person does not. When an accused requests an attorney, either before a police
officer or a magistrate, he does not know which constitutional right he is
invoking.... The simple fact that defendant has requested an attorney indicates
that he does not believe that he is sufficiently capable of dealing with his
adversaries single handedly.
Id. at 185-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633-34 n.7
(1986)). "Having adopted an offense-specific rule for invocation of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, the Court should devote some attention to bringing its Fifth and Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence into a logical alignment, and should give uniform, fair, and workable guidelines for
the criminal justice system." Id. at 183 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Christopher A. McGraw,
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In narrowing the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the
McNeil court was willing to approach Sixth Amendment issues with a
more crime-control oriented philosophy than it had in the past." Unlike
McNeil, earlier Sixth Amendment decisions revealed a Court more
concerned about the fairness of the adversarial process and the due process
rights of the accused. In Brewer v. Williams," Respondent had been
arrested in Davenport, Iowa and charged with abducting a ten-year-old girl
in Des Moines.29 Respondent was arraigned in Davenport and consulted
with an attorney.3" Police, while driving Respondent back to Des Moines,
questioned him without his attorney present and Respondent eventually
directed the officers to the young girl's body.3
The Court recognized that the police purposely sought to isolate
Respondent from his lawyers to elicit "as much incriminating information
as possible."32 While noting the senseless and brutal nature of the crime,

Case Comment, State v. Hatcher: Indigent CriminalDefendants Play Hamlet Without the Ghost
as TheirApplicationsforCourt-AppointedCounselDo Not Invoke Fifth Amendment Based Right
to Counsel in Georgia,29 GA. L. REV. 1205, 1229-30 (1995).
27. The Court stated that adopting Petitioner's proposed rule-no police interrogation
regarding any offense after the defendant had requested a lawyer-would "seriously impede
effective law enforcement." McNeil, 501 U.S. at 180. "The Court's jurisprudence... [reflects] its
strong preference for crime control and efficiency imperatives and its corresponding deprecation
of the critical role of the defense attorney in the criminal process." GARCIA, supra note 13, at 36.
28. 430 U.S. 387 (1976).
29. Id. at 390. Respondent escaped from a mental hospital and abducted the girl from a local
YMCA. Id.
30. Id.at391.
31. Id at 392-93. The detective in the car said to the prisoner, in what has been referred to
as the Christian burial speech:
I want to give you something to think about while we're traveling down the
road.... Number one, I want you to observe the weather conditions, it's raining,
it's sleeting, it's freezing, driving is very treacherous, visibility is poor, it's going
to be dark early this evening. They are predicting several inches of snow for
tonight, and I feel that you yourself are the only person that knows where this little
girl's body is, that you yourself have only been there once, and if you get a snow
on top of it you yourself may be unable to find it. And, since we will be going
right past the area on the way into Des Moines, I feel that we could stop and locate
the body, that the parents of this little girl should be entitled to a Christian burial
for the little girl who was snatched away from them on Christmas [E]ve and
murdered. And I feel we should stop and locate it on the way in rather than
waiting until morning and trying to come back out after a snow storm and possibly
not being able to find it at all.
Id.

32. Id.at 399; see also FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND
CONFESSIONS 5-11 (1967). As Inbau and Reid comment:
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the Court nevertheless held that Respondent was entitled to a new trial as
he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during the carride interrogation.33 The Court conceded that there is enormous pressure
on police investigators to solve such a heinous crime," "[b]ut it is
precisely the predictability of [this pressure] that makes imperative a
resolute loyalty to the guarantees that the Constitution extends to us all." 35
This focus on the rights of the accused was also evident in the Court's
decision in Maine v. Moulton.36 Moulton and Colson were indicted on four
counts of theft.37 Both men retained counsel.38 Prior to trial, the State
offered a deal to Colson, promising they would bring no further charges
against him if he would surreptitiously tape record Moulton making
incriminating statements.39 Colson agreed.4" Wearing a wire, he met with
Moulton to discuss the upcoming trial.4' Moulton made several
incriminating statements not only about the pending charge of theft, but
also about other crimes the two had committed in the past.42 Based on this
information, the prosecution sought several new indictments against
Moulton, and he was eventually convicted of burglary and theft.43
The Supreme Court reversed Moulton's convictions, reasoning that the
introduction of the tape recorded conversations violated Moulton's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.' The state knowingly exploited a codefendant to circumvent Moulton's Sixth Amendment right to be

The principal psychological factor contributing to a successful interrogation is
privacy--being alone with the person under interrogation. This we all seem to
instinctively realize in our own private or social affairs, but in criminal
interrogations it is generally overlooked or ignored. For instance, in asking a
personal friend or acquaintance to divulge a secret, we carefully avoid making the
request in the presence of other persons; we seek a time and place when the matter
can be discussed in private.

kIL

at 5; see also DAVID E. ZuLAWSKI & DOUGLAS E. WICKLANDER, PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF

INTERVIEW AND INTERROGATION 18-19 (1993).
33. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 406.
34. Id.
35. Id
36. 474 U.S. 159, 180 (1985).
37. Id.at 162.
38. Id.
39. Id at 163.
40. Id
41. Id at 165-66. In his meeting with the co-defendant, Moulton's tactic was to feign poor
memory, telling Colson that he simply did not remember what had happened, imploring Colson to
fill in the details. Id.
42. Id.at 166.
43. Id.at 167.
44. Id.at 176.
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confronted and interviewed by police only with his attorney present. 45 The
Court noted that the Sixth Amendment imposes on the State a significant
obligation to respect the defendant's choice to seek the assistance of
counsel. 46 The Court, therefore, held that Moulton's statements pertaining
to both the burglary and the theft were inadmissible.47
If these earlier cases, Brewer and Moulton, expanded a defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, then McNeil no doubt restricted it by
proclaiming this right to be offense-specific. What remained unclear after
' A significant
McNeil, however, was how courts would define "offense."48
majority of lower federal and state courts that addressed the issue
interpreted offense broadly, holding that once the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel attaches to a charged offense, it also attaches to closely related
but uncharged crimes.49
In the instant case, however, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel attaches only to the offense charged, and does not extend

45. See id.
46. Id
47. Id at 180.
48. See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 187 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting). On this
issue, the dissent's warning that "the offense-specific limitation on the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel can only generate confusion in the law" was prophetic. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting). The
Court did not"flesh out the precise boundaries of its newly created 'offense-specific' limitation on
a venerable constitutional right." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Covarrubias, 179 F.3d 1219, 1223-24 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating
that state kidnapping charges and federal charges for the transportation of an illegal alien arose
from the same course of conduct and therefore the offenses were "inextricably intertwined" and
"closely related" for Sixth Amendment purposes); United States v. Melgar, 139 F.3d 1005, 1013
(4th Cir. 1998) ("Once a defendant has invoked his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, although
the government is generally free to interrogate him without counsel as to crimes to which that right
has not attached, the government may not knowingly question him as to crimes closely related to
those to which his Sixth Amendment right has attached."); United States v. Arnold, 106 F.3d 37,
40 (3d Cir. 1997) ("[O]nce the right to counsel attaches with respect to a charged offense, it carries
over to 'closely related' but uncharged crimes."); United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 744 (5th
Cir. 1992) (commenting that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel might attach to a charge that
is "extremely closely related to pending.., charges," particularly when the charges concerned the
same type of crime, "victim, residence, time span, and sovereign"); Taylor v. State, 726 So. 2d.
841,845 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (finding that Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached to burglary
charge as it arose from the same facts and circumstances, and was closely related in time, to the
stolen property charge); State v. Clankie, 530 N.E.2d. 448, 452 (11. 1998) ("The United States
Supreme Court has thus apparently assumed that [S]ixth [A]mendment rights of one formally
charged with an offense extend to offenses closely related to that offense and for which a defendant
is subsequently formally accused."). These lower courts reasoned that "It]o hold otherwise would
allow the [government] to circumvent the Sixth Amendment right to counsel merely by charging
a defendant with additional related crimes" after questioning him without counsel present. In re
Pack, 616 A.2d 1006, 1010-11 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (stating that "burglary charge arose from the
same incident for which the other charges were brought against appellant" and therefore the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel had attached).
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to other factually related, but uncharged crimes.5 ° The instant Court
concluded that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel would extend to
other uncharged crimes only if those crimes required the same proof of
fact as the original, charged offense." Thus, even though the burglary and
killings arose out of the same criminal transaction, Respondent's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel had attached only to the burglary and not the
capital murder. 2 The police were free to interrogate Respondent about the
murders without his counsel present, or without contacting his counsel
prior to the questioning, and his confession was admissible at trial. 3
The instant Court justified its decision on two grounds. First, a
defendant must still be apprised of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel
prior to any custodial interrogation.54 In the instant case, police advised
Respondent of his Mirandarights prior to questioning him and Respondent
waived these rights.5 Second, the Court sought to protect society's interest
in allowing the police the freedom to fully investigate unsolved crimes.56
To require the police to contact a defendant's lawyer prior to questioning
him about a factually related offense would hamper effective law
enforcement."
In avigorous dissent, Justice Breyerjoined by Justices Stevens, Souter
and Ginsburg, observed that the instant Court's narrow definition of
offense will significantly limit the protection afforded defendants under
the Sixth Amendment.5 The dissent noted that with a single, criminal
transaction there are multiple possible "offenses" with which the defendant
may eventually be charged. 9 An armed robber, for example, that grabs the
clerk and demands "your money or your life" has committed armed
robbery, assault, battery, trespass, and the use of a firearm to commit a
felony.6" The instant Court's decision allows police to interrogate the
defendant charged with robbery about any of these other, uncharged

50. See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 164 (2001).
51. Id at 173. This test was first articulated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299
(1932). Id The Court has used the Blockburgertest to determine the scope of the Fifth Amendment
Double Jeopardy clause, which prevents a defendant from being charged twice for the same

offense. Id
52. Id at 174.
53. Id
54. Id. at 171.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 171-72.
57. Id. at 174. "Deterred by the possibility of violating the Sixth Amendment, police likely
would refrain from questioning certain defendants altogether." Id
58. See id. at 179 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 182 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
60. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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offenses-the assault, the battery, the trespass-without ever having to
notify his lawyer.6
The instant case is undoubtedly a dramatic departure from the Sixth
Amendmentjurisprudence embodied in Brewerand Moulton-somuch so
that, as the dissent noted, if the instant Court's reasoning were applied to
those two cases they would have both been decided differently.62 In
Brewer, the defendant had been formally charged with abduction at the
time of his car-ride interrogation; he had not been charged with firstdegree murder.63 The two crimes were factually related in that they arose
out of the same criminal transaction.' They were, however, separate
offenses in that, as defined by the instant Court, they each required a
different proof of fact.65 Thus, applying the instant Court's reasoning, the
police were free to interrogate the defendant in the long car ride back to
Des Moines about the murder without ever contacting his attorney.66 After
all, even though the defendant had a lawyer, that lawyer was only there to
represent him on the abduction charge, as the murder was a different
offense.
Similarly, in Moulton, the defendant was originally only charged with
theft.67 After police surreptitiously recorded the defendant, the State
brought the additional charge of burglary.68 The Moulton Court reversed
both of the defendant's convictions, holding that the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel had been violated.69 Using the instant Court's
analysis, however, because the charges of theft and burglary require
different proofs of fact, the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel

61. See id. at 183 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The dissent considered two other examples to
illustrate how one criminal transaction could result in the prosecution of many different offenses.
A person selling and using drugs may be charged with
possessing various drugs, conspiring to sell drugs, being under the influence of
illegal drugs, possessing drug paraphernalia, possessing a gun in relation to the
drug sale .... A protester blocking an entrance to a federal building might also
be trespassing, failing to disperse, unlawfully assembling, and obstructing
Government administration all at one and the same time.
Id at 182 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
62. Id at 183 (Breyer, J., dissenting). To be sure, the instant Court does not expressly
overrule BrewerandMoulton. Rather, the dissent used these two cases to illustrate what are, in their
view, the dramatic effects of the instant Court's rule. See id (Breyer, J., dissenting).
63. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 390 (1976).

64. Id
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Cobb, 532 U.S. at 184 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 162 (1985).
Id. at 167.
Id. at 180.
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attached only to the theft charge, and not the burglary charge.7 ° Therefore,
only the defendant's theft conviction would be overturned, as the burglary
was a different offense.7
The instant Court justified its decision, in part, on the theory that
defendants are still advised of their Fifth Amendment right to counsel prior
to any interrogation by police officers. 2 But how much information do
these Fifth Amendment warnings truly provide to a defendant accused of
a crime?73 The Mirandawarnings do not inform the accused that a lawyer
is best able to negotiate a plea bargain, or that these negotiations are most
effective before a defendant has submitted himself to interrogation.74 Nor
do the Miranda warnings include an explanation of what charges the
prosecution has brought against the defendant.75
Indeed, at the heart of the instant Court's decision is the concern that
requiring police officers to contact a defendant's attorney prior to
questioning him about a factually related charge would undermine
effective law enforcement.76 The instant Court's holding prevents the
defense attorney from even being aware that his client is questioned, and
therefore the attorney may not be able to offer his client much needed
advice regarding these other offenses.
The instant Court has, therefore, potentially altered the nature of the
attorney-client relationship.77 The attorney's relationship with his client

70. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 183-84 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
71. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). The instant Court did not expressly refute the conclusion,
offered by the dissenting justices, that Brewer and Moulton would have been decided differently
using this new analysis. Rather, the instant Court responded simply by noting that the "offensespecific" nature of the Sixth Amendment was not part of their analysis at the time those cases were
decided. Id. at 169-70.
72. Id,at 171.
73. See supranote 3.
74. See Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 308 (1988) (Stevens, J. dissenting).
75. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76. See H. Richard Uviller, Evidence from the Mind of the Criminal Suspect: A
Reconsiderationof the CurrentRules ofAccess and Restraint,87 CoLUM. L. REV. 1137, 1170-71
(1987). "It is difficult to imagine lawyers enhancing fairness in interrogations .... The sole
function of counsel in such circumstances is to preclude the probe, or at least render it fruitless."
Id. Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion in McNeil, described this as "a preference for an
inquisitorial system that'regards the defense lawyer as an impediment rather than a servant to the
cause ofjustice." McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 183 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
77. McNeil, 501 U.S. at 183 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Model Rules of Professional
Conduct R 4.2 (2002) stated: "In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the
subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in
the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so."
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). In light of the instant Court's narrow definition of offense with respect
to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, it is unclear whether the "scope of representation" is also
narrower with respect to Rule 4.2. The instant Court did not discuss this issue in any great depth,
though the concern was raised during oral arguments in the following exchange:
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may now be confined to only the offense charged, as other factually
related charges would fall outside the scope of the lawyer's
representation." This result runs counter to what a layman expects when
he prepares to defend himself against a wide-ranging criminal
investigation by the State.
The instant Court, alternatively, could have followed the trend of the
majority of lower courts79 by defining offense broadly, as encompassing
the defendant's course of conduct on a particular occasion.80 Thus, in the
robbery hypothetical discussed earlier, the defendant's lawyer would
represent him not only on the charge of robbery, but on any possible
charge the State chooses to bring in response to the defendant's course of
conduct in robbing the store. This approach, the dissenting justices
concluded, would make more sense, and would be more consistent with

QUESTION: It seems to me it's not the question of when the lawyer was
appointed, but what is the scope of the representation by the lawyer who has been
appointed.
Assume a lawyer is paid $20 an hour by the State for representing a defendant.
He's appointed then to represent him in the robbery charge, then he talks to the
client, the client says, there's a lot of other stuff I think you ought to know in
order to represent me well, and then he goes and interviews him at great length
about all these things that happened in the same transaction, but they've never
been indicted. Would that lawyer be entitled to be paid for the time he spent on
questioning about the related crimes?...
MS. BLATT [On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the
petitioner]: If he said to his lawyer, I also murdered these two people, I think it
would be perfectly clear that the-if the defendant went off and started
researching capital sentencing procedures under Texas law he very well might not
get paid for that. He was appointed to represent his client on the burglary
charge....
QUESTION: So he's-the lawyer, the good, conscientious lawyer would say,
well, don't talk to me about that because I'm not going to get paid for advice I
give you on that, on those matters?
MS. BLATT: No, he certainly will want to talk to his client with respect to the
conduct that constituted the offense for which he's been charged, and there might
be other things he needs to know about.... [H]e's certainly free to tell his client,
I'm not competent to represent you in a death penalty case and you ought to retain
separate counsel for that offense, and moreover, you haven't even been charged
with that offense.
Texas v. Cobb, Oral Argument, 22-24, Jan. 16,2001, availableat http://www.supremecourtus.gov
/oral arguments/argument transcripts.html.
78. See McNeil, 501 U.S. at 183 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79. See supra note 49.
80. See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 186 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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the Court's earlier Sixth Amendment jurisprudence in Brewer and
Moulton.!8 '
Instead, the instant Court's narrow definition of offense not only
weakens a constitutional safeguard long recognized to be fundamental, but
it casts potential confusion and uncertainty into the attorney-client
relationship.82 As a result of the instant case, police have broader powers
than ever before to interrogate a defendant without his attorney present.8
While empowering law enforcement, the instant Court has lost sight of
Sixth Amendment guarantees it once considered sacrosanct.

81. See id. at 187 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
82. See supra note 77.
83. See Cobb, 532 U.S. at 182-83 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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